Michigan Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 6

1949

WILLS-RIGHT OF LEGATEE TO RENOUNCE TO DETRIMENT OF
CREDITORS
William R. Worth
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
William R. Worth, WILLS-RIGHT OF LEGATEE TO RENOUNCE TO DETRIMENT OF CREDITORS, 47 MICH. L.
REV. 866 (1949).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol47/iss6/29

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

866

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

Wu.Ls-RIGHT OF LEGATEE TO RENouNCE TO DETRIMENT oF CREDITORS-A

judgment creditor of an insolvent residuary legatee commenced supplementary
proceedings to reach the legacy. While these proceedings were pending, some ten
months after the will was probated, and after testifying that he had a one-third
interest in the residuary estate, the legatee £.led a formal renunciation of his
interest. In the proceeding by the executors for a final accounting, the Surrogate's
Court and the Appellate Division ruled that the renunciation was effective to
divest the judgment debtor of his interest under the will. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. In re Wilson's Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E. (2d)
852 (1949).
It is well established that a legatee may renounce a legacy and thereby prevent
the vesting of any interest under the will.1 Although there is a presumption of
acceptance of a beneficial bequest, proof of renunciation will defeat this presumption. 2 This result is reached either on the theory that title vests immediately upon
death of the testator, subject to being divested by renunciation,3 or that the legacy
leaves the title in abeyance until accepted or refused.4 Any effective disclaimer
relates back to the time of death and title passes as if the legacy had not been in
the will. r; The general approach has been that the right to renounce is absolute

1 Bouse v. Hull, 168 Md. 1, 176 A. 645 (1935); Olsen v. Wright, 119 N.J. Eq. 103,
181 A. 182 (1935); Albany Hosp. v. Albany Guardian Society, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E.
812 (1915).
2 Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md. 378, 140 A. 100 (1928); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa
474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922).
3 Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P. (2d) 768 (1934).
4 This theory has usually been expressed by analogizing a legacy to an offer. Albany
Hosp. v. Albany Guardian Society, 214 N.Y. 435, 108 N.E. 812 (1915).
5 Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1907); Dare v. New Brunswick
Trust Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 349, 194 A. 61 (1937). Thus a renounced general legacy falls into
the residuary estate; Myers v. Smith, 235 Iowa 385, 16 N.W. (2d) 628 (1944); and a
renounced residuary legacy goes by intestacy: New York Trust Co. v. Halkin, 68 N.Y.S.
(2d) 404 (1946).
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and cannot be subjected to the control of courts or creditors, the relation back displacing any claims which meanwhile have attached to the interest of the legatee. 6
In absence of a collusive agreement to obtain a benefit in exchange for renunciation, the motive of the legatee is immaterial.7 As it prevents title from vesting, the
disclaimer is not considered a taxable transfer of property,8 nor may it be set aside
as a conveyance in fraud of creditors.9 However, this right is subject to some
restrictions. The renunciation must be clear and unequivocal, 10 and an acceptance, which may be implied from manifestations of ownership or control, is final.11
If renunciation is not made within a reasonable time, the presumption of acceptance becomes conclusive.12 The instant case is nominally based on this ground,
although, as the dissent points out, a delay of ten months has not usually been
regarded as unreasonable, in the absence of some element of estoppel. It would
seem that the actual basis of the decision is the feeling that one should devote all
available assets to the discharge of his obligations, and that he should not be permitted to divert property to the heirs-at-law indirectly, by renunciation, when he
could not do so directly by assignment. These policy arguments have led one court
to disregard the technical rule that title cannot vest without acceptance, and hold
that a legatee can renounce only if the claims of his creditors may be otherwise
satisfied.13 Nevertheless, the weight of authority still supports the rule that neither
creditors nor courts are empowered to prevent an insolvent legatee from renouncing his legacy, so long as he has not previously accepted it.

William R. Worth
o Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931); Funk v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314,
213 N.W. 608 (1927); 4 PAGE ON WILLs, 3d., Lifetime ed., §1405. The same rule applies
to renunciation of a gift by an insolvent donee. Lynch v. Lynch, 201 S.C. 130, 21 S.E. (2d)
569 (1942).
7 Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); People v. Flanagin, 331
Ill. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928).
s Brown v. Routzahn, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 914, cert. den., 290 U.S. 641,
54 S.Ct. 60 (1933).
9 Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1907); Ohio Nat. Bank of Columbus v. Miller, (Ohio App. 1943) 57 N.E. (2d) 717; contra, Neeld's Estate, (Pa. 1940)
38 D &C 381.
10 Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846 (1931).
llBogenrief v. Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229 (1937); Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore.
43, 31 P. (2d) 768 (1934).
12 Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164-P. 1100 (1917); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255,
147 S.W. (2d) 424 (1941). But it has been held that delay alone will not constitute acceptance. McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa 37, 282 N.W. 786 (1938).
13 In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. (2d) 807, 108 P. (2d) 401 (1940), 25 MINN. L. REv. 951
(1941), 29 CALIF. L. REv. 531 (1941). See also 18 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 142 (1940); 37
MxcH. L. REv. 1168 (1939); 43 YALE L. J. 1030 (1934), for other criticisms of the decisions.

